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MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ROSARIO SALAMIDA NUÑEZ, LALAINE NARAG PAULE AND MARILOU DIALINO BARE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

 [ G.R. No. 235480, January 27, 2021 ]

INTING, J.:

Disposition:    The petition is DISMISSED.

FACTS

After the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found probable cause against petitioners for two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, and two (2) counts of Malversation under the RPC. The Ombudsman indicted the petitioners of facilitating with "undue haste" the processing of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) pertaining to Cagas' PDAF allocation.

Petitioners, however, filed a Joint Omnibus Motion: (1) Motion for Outright Dismissal for Clear Lack of Probable Cause; (2) Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest; and (3) Motion for Bill of Particulars, dated April 3, 2017.

On September 18, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying, among others, herein petitioners' Joint Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. It maintained its earlier assessment that all the accused were probably guilty of the offenses respectively charged against them; that the factual and legal issues raised by petitioners should be passed upon after a full-blown trial; and that there was nothing vague in the phrase "facilitated the processing of the aforementioned SARO and corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation" in the Informations containing the factual averments constituting the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended.


ISSUE

Whether or not Sandiganbayan acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged Resolution dated September 18, 2017 which denied petitioners' Motion for Outright Dismissal for Clear Lack of Probable Cause; 


RULING

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

The Court in People v. Castillo, et al. briefly discussed the two kinds of determination of probable cause, executive and judicial, to wit:

x x x The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

After the Sandiganbayan's own judicial determination that there was a necessity for placing herein petitioners under custody, and accordingly issued arrest warrants against them, the issue as to the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause to indict petitioners is rendered moot.

In other words, because the proceedings before the Ombudsman are distinct from those before the Sandiganbayan, as soon as probable cause is already judicially determined, all matters raised on the executive determination of probable cause already becomes moot such as in this case where petitioners' arguments are leading to the propriety of Ombudsman's finding of probable cause to indict them.

Interestingly, petitioners herein argue that there is a patent lack of probable cause as the cases against them are built upon hearsay, and therefore inadmissible evidence being based merely on Luy's claims.

The Court disagrees.

"Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." It needs further stressing that for the determination of probable cause, the average person weighs such facts and circumstances without knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and relies purely on common sense of which all reasonable persons have in abundance. Therefore, for issuance of a warrant of arrest, the standard used is that which is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused.

Verily, as long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, it creates a sufficient ground for the trial court judge to issue a warrant of arrest against him or her.


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