FACTS: Respondent M. Lhuiller has a branch in
San Fernando, Pampanga and had installed its signage free from any obstacle. On
the other hand, petitioner Visayan Electric Company is the only electric distribution
company in San Fernando, Pampanga. When the Municipality of San Fernando,
Pampanga commenced its road widening project, the Municipal engineer asked the
petitioner to relocate its post as this will be affected by the said project.
Petitioner relocated its post closer to the signage of M.Lhuiller with a
distance of only inches between them. Because of the constant rubbing of the
sagging wires of the petitioner with M. Lhuiller signage a fire broke out. As a
result, the fire destroyed the properties of respondents Emilio Alfeche,
Gilbert Alfeche, Emmanuel Manugas. When the respondents demands payment of
indemnity for damages, the petitioner refused to pay. It denied its liability,
arguing that the cause of fire was attributable to respondent M.Lhuiller,
because by placing their signage near their pole, it caused abrasion and the
fire.
ISSUE: Whether
or not the proximate cause of fire was attributable to the negligence of the
petitioner and not by the respondent M.Lhuiller?
HELD: Yes. The
proximate cause of fire was attributable to the negligence of the petitioner
and not by the respondent M.Lhuiller.
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that
VECO's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered by respondents
Emilio, Gilbert, and Manugas. All the elements for liability for a quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Codehave been shown to be attendant on VECO's
part. The elements of a quasi-delict are:
1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred.
On the first element, it is undisputed that the Alfeches
and Manugas suffered damage because of the fire. What has hitherto remained
unresolved is which between VECO and M. Lhuillier is liable to indemnify
them.
Fault is "a voluntary act or omission which causes
damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of
[another]."On the other hand, "[n]egligence is the failure to observe
for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. "
Between VECO and M. Lhuillier, it is VECO which this Court
finds to have been negligent.
M. Lhuillier was not negligent in installing its signage.
It installed its signage in 1995 well before the road-widening and drainage
projects commenced and ahead of VECO's relocation of its posts. Solon and
Camuta both emphasized that the signage was installed free of any obstacle.
Other than VECO's evasive accusations, there is no proof to the contrary.
It was VECO that was negligent. It is apparent that it
transferred its posts and wires without regard for the hazards that the
transfer entailed, particularly with respect to the installations which had
previously been distant from the wires and posts but which had since come into
close proximity.
VECO is a public utility tasked with distributing
electricity to consumers. It is its duty to ensure that its posts are properly
and safely installed. As the holder of a public franchise, it is to be presumed
that it has the necessary resources and expertise to enable a safe and
effective installation of its facilities. By installing its posts and wires
haphazardly, without regard to how its wires could come in contact with a
previously installed signage, VECO failed to act in keeping with the diligence
required of it. Proximate cause is
defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred."
VECO' s negligence was the proximate cause of the damage
suffered by the Alfeches and Manugas. It is settled that the confluence of
proximity, abrasion, and shortcircuiting led to the fire. The first of
these-proximityarose because of VECO's relocation of posts and wires. Installed
in such a manner that its wires constantly touched M. Lhuillier' s signage,
this "led to the failure of the insulation thereby causing a short circuit
which eventuallyled to the breaking and burning of the wire."It was this
burning wire that fell on the Alfeches' residence's roof and burned down their
house and store, as well as Manugas' adjacent shop.
VECO would have this Court sustain a flimsy excuse for
evading liability. Attempting to break the all too apparent causal connection
between its negligence and the injury suffered by the plaintiffs, it would
insist on absurdities that strain common sense and vainly attempt to discredit
even its own witness. This Court finds no merit in VECO's pretenses and
sustains the Court of Appeals decision.
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