SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Summary: A person who is not a party in the main action cannot be the subject of the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction. 

FACTS: In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway.

Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property was located in Barangay Cupang, which Sunrise Garden Corporation planned to develop into a memorial park.

The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and Sunrise Garden Corporation.

Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move the construction equipment.

Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.

While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed city road.

The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion.

On January 29, 2003, the trial court issued an Order stating that since First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. could not prove ownership over the properties, then First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or any of its hired security agencies must comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

K-9 Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating their arguments that since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over them, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction could not be enforced against them. First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.

HELD: While Rule 14, Section 20[212] of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the... person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance." Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.

The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.