Summary: When
the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent
search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference
that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or
both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to
establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.
FACTS: Before
this Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David
(David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned
at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar found her outside the
church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. He later turned her over to Mr.
and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar that the infant was found on
September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal
promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by
Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces).
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States.
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the
moment she renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained
solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo
warranto is DISMISSED. David moved for reconsideration.
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the
Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling
whose parents are unknown, private respondent fails to satisfy the jus
sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino
"blood line," which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's
determination of who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding
from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private respondent was never
a natural-born citizen, she could never leave reverted to natural-born status
despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.
ISSUES: He seeks
for judicial review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and
conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.
The breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for
certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
HELD: All
constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which provide
for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral
Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal
shall be the "sole" judge.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope
of any review.
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial
review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in
the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing.
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate
Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our
review is limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in
jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional
organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections,
makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical
pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a
party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or
not accounted for
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or
of statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the
current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion.
The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral
Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
only asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully
considering the established personal circumstances of private respondent.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or
both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings,
they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy
must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no
fault of the foundling, remains unknown.
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a
Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement in the Constitution
making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a
reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution
provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations
of its framers and the implications of international legal instruments.
The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born
unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily
engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its
provisions on citizenship.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This
status' commencement from birth means that private respondent never had to do
anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though
subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon
satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is
qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2
specifically articulates those who may count themselves as natural-born.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1
and the need to establish bloodline is misplaced.
To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born
citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her
citizenship.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private
respondent went through the actual naturalization process.
Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of
natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an
entirely different premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.
It should be with the actual process of naturalization that
natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating
to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled
diminution of the status of citizens.
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a
human thoroughbred.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be
natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to conform to
traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or
both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is
irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino
bloodline.
The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings
found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a
Filipino mother and are thus naturalborn, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino
citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling
citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the highest
possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means
such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization
of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the
Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged
proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular
politician from office.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens
creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority
through no fault of their own.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings
cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be
registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights,
deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden
them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights effect the constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children
and protecting them from discrimination.
As it is settled that private respondent's being a
foundling is not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as
to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private
respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino
citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the United
States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private
respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in
Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship [b]y
naturalization in a foreign country."
Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship
when she was naturalized an
American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship.
Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act
9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that
is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this
retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to
this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and
other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section
5).
Those who became citizens of another country before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine
citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon
compliance with certain solemnities.
This reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as
though it was never lost at all.
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized
elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must comply with all of
the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution,[251] Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the
exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath."
Private respondent has complied with all of these
requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a
registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. This evidences her
compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to
vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship.
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully
reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other
requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in
Republic Act No. 9225.
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's
having had to comply with
Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized,
rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to
perfect citizenship.
Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only
from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de
jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may
have consequences de facto.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December
3, 2015 Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a
natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.
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