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PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. CELSO E. FUENTES


FACTS: Celso E. Fuentes, a security guard by Protective designated at Post 33. On July 20, 2000, NPA ransacked Post 33 and took some firearms, Agency-issued uniforms and personal items. On the same day, Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to the PNP. 

However, a complaint for robbery committed by a band against Fuentes was filed due to the affidavit of Lindo, Jr. and Cempron that Fuentes conspired and acted in consort with the New People’s Army basing.  

While was Fuentes was detained, he alleged that he was "mauled and tied up by the security officers of [Protective]." To preserve proof of these claims, Fuentes had pictures taken of his injuries while in custody and acquired a medical certificate detailing his injuries. But On August 15, 2001, the OPP of dismissed due to lack of Probable cause. 

Fuentes ,right after the criminal complaint was dismissed, demanded to return to work but he was refused entry on the ground that he was a member of the NPA and that his position had already been filled up by another security guard. 

Hence, On March 14, 2002, Fuentes filed the Complaint "for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay, service incentive leave and damages against Protective. 

On their part petitioner alleged that Fuentes abandoned his work and that he only filed for illegal dismissal after 6 mos. 

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Fuentes abandoned his work to constitute legal dismissal. 

2.  Whether or not Fuentes belatedly filed his complaint. 

3.  Whether or not respondent is entitled to backwages.

4.  Whether or not Respondent’s right to procedural due process was observed.  

HELD: 1. The absence of respondent does not constitute abandonment. 

Abandonment constitutes a just cause for dismissal because "[t]he law in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." The employer cannot be compelled to maintain an employee who is remiss in fulfilling his duties to the employer, particularly the fundamental task of reporting to work. 

However in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court discussed the concept of abandonment: 

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. 

In the present case, According to petitioner, respondent’s actions constitute a failure to report to work without a valid and justifiable reason. The respondent’s failure to return to work was justified because of his detention and its adverse effects. Moreover, while in the custody of the police, he suffered physical violence in the hands of its employees. Thus, the intervening period when respondent failed to report for work, from respondent’s prison release to the time he actually reported for work, was justified. Since there was a justifiable reason for respondent’s absence, the first element of abandonment was not established. 

For the second element, Petitioner alleges that since respondent "vanished" and failed to report immediately to work, he clearly intended to sever ties with petitioner. 

However, respondent reported for work after August 15, 2001, when the criminal Complaint against him was dropped but petitioner refused to allow respondent to resume his employment because petitioner believed that respondent was a member of the New People’s Army and had already hired a replacement.  

Respondent’s act of reporting for work after being cleared of the charges against him showed that he had no intention to sever ties with his employer. 

Thus, respondent’s actions showed that he intended to resume working for petitioner. The second element of abandonment was not proven, as well. 

2. The six-month period from the alleged date of dismissal by petitioner to the date of filing of the complaint is justified. 

In Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc., this court made the distinction between money claims under Article 291 and the claims for backwages under Article 1146 of the Civil Code: 

Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred. 

Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, bonuses, salary differentials, and illegal deductions by an employer. It also covers money claims arising from seafarer contracts. 

The provision, however, does not cover "money claims" consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover claims for damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides: 

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:  (1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff[.] 

This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. A claim for backwages, according to this court, may be a money claim "by reason of its practical effect." Legally, however, an award of backwages "is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer." Though it results "in the enrichment of the individual [illegally dismissed], the award of backwages is not in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code." Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff." Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, therefore, governs these actions. 

Petitioner admits that respondent filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal six (6) months after the first time petitioner had refused to allow respondent to work. This is well within the four-year prescriptive period provided by Article 1146 of the Labor Code, as mentioned in Arriola. 

In this case, the six-month period from the date of dismissal to the filing of the Complaint was well within reason and cannot be considered "inexcusable delay." The cases filed before the courts and administrative tribunals originate from human experience. Thus, this court will give due consideration to the established facts which would justify the gap of six (6) months prior to the filing of the complaint. 

3.  Applying the doctrine of "no work, no pay," the computation of backwages should only begin from the date of the filing of the Complaint. 

The SC applied the case of Standard Electric wherein respondent was not entitled to the entirety of the backwages during the time of his detention 

Hence, respondent is not entitled to backwages from August 15, 2001, the date of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint against respondent. Absent proof of the actual date that respondent first reported for work and was refused by petitioner, the date of the filing of the Complaint should serve as the basis from which the computation of backwages should begin. Thus, this court finds that respondent is entitled to full backwages starting only on March 14, 2002 until actual reinstatement. 

4.  Respondent’s right to procedural due process was not observed.  

The two-notice requirement was not followed. There was no attempt from petitioner to serve the proper notice on respondent at the address contained in its employment records. Respondent was replaced without being given an 'opportunity to explain his absence.

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