FACTS: Petitioner Herminio Harry Roque
filed a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt against respondents Gen.
Gregorio Pio Catapang, Brig. Gen. Arthur Ang, and Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, for
violating Rule 139-B, Section18 of the Rules of Court.
Roques is the lawyer of Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude,
26-year old Filipino, who was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by
19-year old US Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton.
The question of custody over Pemberton was subject of
public discussions. Pemberton was eventually transferred from his ship to a
facility in the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On October 22, 2014, news broke out that Pemberton had been
flown into Camp Aguinaldo, where a detention facility had been constructed for
him, in the premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board.
Thus, Roque, together with his clients, the family of
Laude, went to Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to demand to see Pemberton.
Respondents stated that Roque, with his clients, forced
their way inside the premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement
Board and gained entry despite having been instructed by Military Police
personnel not to enter the compound, and even though the gates were
closed.
Roque allegedly fomented disorder by inciting his clients
to scale the perimeter fence, to see Pemberton.
In response to the events, respondents filed a disbarment
complaint against Roque. Prior to this, the Respondents released a press
statements regarding the petition and conducted press conferences on the
matter.
In this regard, Roque alleged that this press statement was
reported on, and generously quoted from, by media, and thus are contumacious
violations of the Rules of Court. Further, Roque claimed that respondents' acts
put to question his professional and personal reputation.
ISSUES: 1.
Whether respondents' public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.
2. Whether respondents may be punished for contempt.
HELD: No. The
confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not
to be applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. As a
general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be
restricted. Matters of public interest should not be censured for the sake of
an unreasonably strict application of the confidentiality rule.
As to violation of
confidentiality rule: The confidentiality rule requires only that
"proceedings against attorneys" be kept private and confidential. It
is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and
confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual
disbarment complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so far
that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions.
Petitioner assails two acts as violating the
confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed public threats of filing a
disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public statement that they
had filed a disbarment complaint.
Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there
is nothing to keep private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made
before November 4, 2014, and there was no proceeding to keep private. Also, a close
examination reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits punishment
for contempt. It only declared three things: first, respondent AFP filed a
disbarment complaint against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and
thus, must conduct himself according to the standards of the legal profession;
and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is prohibited by the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
As to Power of
contempt vs Right to free expression: The
power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of expression,
especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters.
The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without careful consideration
of the circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of
punishing the act. Especially where freedom of speech and press is involved,
this Court has given a restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes
contempt.
The Court, in deciding Danguilan-Vitug
v. Court of Appeals, ruled that an article which does not impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice is not contumacious.
"Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired
through the exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court unless there
is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice.” (Cabansag
v. Fernandez quoting Craig v Hamey)
“The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.” (Cabansag,
supra, quoting Schenck vs. U.S.).
“The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other
hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in
determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to
protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases
and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of
the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while
guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to
restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts
against contempt.” (Cabansag, supra,
quoting Gilbert vs. Minnesota)
“This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary
that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent.” (Cabansag,
supra, quoting Gitlow vs. New York)
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